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Observing Participating Observation
—A Re-description Based on Systems Theory
Tina Bering Keiding
Abstract: Current methodology concerning participating observation in general leaves the act of 
observation unobserved. Approaching participating observation from systems theory offers 
fundamental new insights into the topic. Observation is always participation. There is no way to 
escape becoming a participant and, as such, co-producer of the observed phenomenon. There is 
no such thing as a neutral or objective description. As observation deals with differences and 
process meaning, all descriptions are re-constructions and interpretations of the observed. Hence, 
the idea of neutral descriptions as well as the idea of the naïve observer becomes a void. Not 
recognizing and observing oneself as observer and co-producer of empirical data simply leaves the 
process of observation as the major unobserved absorber of contingency in data production based 
on participating observation.
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1. Setting the Scene
From 2007 to 2009, three research conferences were held about the 
methodologies of systems theory1. However, only a single contribution addressed 
the methodology of in situ interaction studies. This contribution concerned 
1 "Methodologies of Systemic Ttheory—Empirical Research and Form Analysis," Dubrovnik, 
Croatia, April 2-6, 2007, http://www.iuc.hr/conference-details.php?id=92, [Date of access: July 1, 
2010].
"Arbeitskreis Funktionale Analyse, Universität Hohenheim," Stuttgart; Germany, September 4-6, 
2008, http://www.funktionale-analyse.isinova.org/# [Date of access: July 1, 2010].
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educational research and argued that in situ studies are fundamental for the 
production of knowledge about the processes of teaching and learning (KEIDING 
& KRUSE, 2008). Educational studies often delimit themselves to descriptions of 
conditions, learning outcomes or participants' experiences (e.g., KLETTE 2007, 
2008). However, what one roughly might call "input and output studies" leave the 
fundamental processes of teaching and learning unobserved. Consequently 
educational research has brought itself into a situation in which teaching as 
interaction is often handled as a huge "black-box.". From this position, 
educational research might be able to answer questions on "what works" but is 
unable to understand "how it works." [1]
The relevance of in situ studies is not delimited to educational research but has 
relevance for many topics in social science as well as the humanities. Taking this 
into account, this contribution addresses how in situ observation studies in 
general can be understood and conceptualized through Niklas LUHMANN's 
systems theory. [2]
In situ observations as observations where the observer observes interaction by 
being present as interaction emerges is familiar from anthropology, ethnography, 
social science and psychology—often, under the label "participating observation" 
(e.g. BERNARD, 1998; CRANO & BREWER, 2002; HAMMERSLEY, 2006; 
HEDEGAARD, 1984; HOWITT & CRAMER, 2005; LANGDRIDGE, 2004; 
LINDLOF, 1995; SANJEK, 1990; WADEL, 1991). However, current reflections on 
methods and techniques for participating observation are either incompatible with 
or inadequate from a systems theoretical approach. [3]
The paper will concentrate on four subjects: namely, the concepts of observation 
and participation, the concept of meaning, and note-taking. To avoid general 
theoretical descriptions, the concepts of systems theory in general are introduced 
successively as they emerge in the text. [4]
2. Participation and Observation
"Participating observation" connects the two phenomena "observation" and 
"participation." They are often opposed for the construction of a range of types of 
participating observation—for instance, "pure observation" versus "pure 
participation" (DEWALT, DEWALT & WAYLAND, 1998, p.262) or "complete 
participation" versus "complete observation" (LINDLOF, 1995, pp.141-149). This 
habit indirectly describes observation and participation as events, which can be 
separated from one another. [5]
According to Niklas LUHMANN, the key phrase regarding interaction systems is 
"der Wahrnehmung des Wahrgenommenwerdens" (LUHMANN, 2002a, p.56). It 
might be translated as "perception of being perceived" and underlines that 
participating in interaction is tightly intertwined with mutual experiences of being 
"Niklas Luhmann's Theory of Self-referential Systems. Theoretical and Empirical Research," 
Dubrovnik, Croatia, September 14-18, 2009, http://www.iuc.hr/conference-details.php?id=145 
[Date of access: July 1, 2010].
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perceived. When one as an individual connects to or engages in interaction, one 
becomes aware that one is observed and perceived by other participants. 
Participation does not mean that one has to contribute to communication by 
expressing oneself. Just being present makes one as participant: "In practice, 
one cannot not communicate in an interaction system; one must withdraw if one 
wants to avoid communication" (LUHMANN, 1995a, p.413). [6]
The terms participation and participating in communication might lead us to forget 
that social systems consist of communication and that human individuals, 
according to Niklas LUHMANN (e.g. 1995a, pp.210f.), belong to the environment 
of social systems. Accordingly, participation in this context does not mean "being 
part of" in the sense of included or integrated in. To participate means to 
contribute to social interaction by providing the structural complexity of one's 
psychic system for the communication's selection of information, utterance and 
understanding and to expose one psychic system to communication, thereby 
allowing communication and actions to stimulate new thoughts and impressions, 
which produce new points of departures for the process of observation (e.g. 
LUHMANN, 2002b). [7]
Utterance of information can be attributed to human beings, who thereby enter 
communication as persons (LUHMANN, 1995a, p.210; 1995b). Attribution allows 
social identification. Nevertheless, all communicative events refer to 
communication, not to the human individuals: 
"Observers can predict action better by knowing a situation than by knowing people, 
and correspondingly, their observation of action often, if not always, is not concerned 
with the mental state of the actor, but with carrying out the autopoietic reproduction of 
the social system. Nevertheless, everyday action is attributed to individuals. Such 
extremely unrealistic behavior can only be explained by a need to reduce complexity" 
(LUHMANN, 1995a, p.166). [8]
As regards participating observation, this means that the observer is co-producer 
of the observed interaction and that, when he or she attributes communicative 
events and actions to observed individuals, he or she omits to observe that 
meaning refers to the situation and the specific interaction rather than to single 
individuals, who might behave completely differently in a similar situation. A 
student might appear unengaged in one lesson and very active in a subsequent 
lesson. That the actions of observed persons refer to and must be interpreted 
with the social system as point of reference does not only apply to the 
observation of systems that count more persons than the observer and the 
observed. Also in systems in which the observer observes how a single person 
interacts with objects, it must be taken into consideration that actions take place 
and refer to a social system. One might even consider whether the experience of 
being observed in this case is more present and has stronger influence on the 
observed than in social systems with several participants. [9]
Attribution of human beings to the environment of social systems has produced 
strong reactions and accusations of "anti-humanism." This discussion falls 
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outside the scope of this contribution but is addressed in Tina B. KEIDING (2005, 
pp.115f.). However, a few lines should be spent on Niklas LUHMANN's own reply 
to the critique: 
"If one views human beings as part of the environment of society (instead of as part 
of society itself), this changes the premises of all the traditional questions, including 
those of classical humanism. It does not mean that the being is estimated as less 
important than traditionally. Anyone who thinks so (and such an understanding either 
explicitly or implicitly underlies all polemics against this proposal) has not understood 
the paradigm change in systems theory" (LUHMANN, 1995a, p.212). [10]
Consequently, participating observation should not be considered from the 
difference participating/observing but rather from a perspective of how the 
observer participates—for instance, expressed in terms of involvement. An 
observer engaging in discussions, asking questions, etc., exposes him- or herself 
to a different complexity and, consequently, challenges his or her opportunities 
for moments for programmatic self-observation in different ways than an observer 
participating solely as addressee. On the other hand, direct involvement produces 
opportunities to test understandings and meaning attribution. [11]
The matter of involvement is not unambiguous, nor can it be decided at a general 
level. It is a question that must be answered in each specific case by weighing 
opportunities and challenges against each other and must be addressed explicitly 
to create transparency—at least, at the level of programs for and reflections on 
observation. In situ, there is no privileged vantage point from which interaction 
can be observed without becoming a part of it. The observer is, for better or 
worse, thrown into interaction and a co-producer of the research object. [12]
One might question whether observation of video- or audio-recorded interaction 
should be considered as interaction. The observer and the observed do not 
perceive each other directly. But the observed might still be aware that they are 
observed, and the observer definitely becomes co-producer of meaning when he 
or she observes the recordings. Not in situ but displaced in time and place; in a 
different context. There is no simple method to choose one approach over 
another. Advantages and disadvantages must be observed, which forces the 
observer to observe how he or she observes the observed observers' 
observations. [13]
2.1 From person to personality
Participating in and observing communication implies construction of "the other," 
a topic that Niklas LUHMANN only addresses sporadically. He distinguishes 
between persons and human individuals and uses the word "person" to "indicate 
the social identification of a complex of expectations directed toward an individual 
human being" (LUHMANN, 1995a, p.210). The distinction between person and 
human individual addresses a logical consequence of the theory's description of 
social and psychic systems as functionally closed and an environment for each 
other. An observer can only observe communication, acts and physical 
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phenomena. He or she has no access to what other participants as humans 
individuals mean, think or feel, including no access to their motives and reasons. [14]
Construction of a person initially draws on the bodily and physical appearance 
and only later on experiences with and expectations for the person as participant 
in communication (LUHMANN, 1995b). Drawing on a few observations, 
interaction actualizes a horizon of expectations and allocated meaningful 
utterances and understanding. Metaphorically, one might say that a pattern of 
expectations—and thereby a person—is constructed in the light of few context 
markers. Pattern construction and pattern recognition is a key topic in Gregory 
BATESON's (2000, pp.292f.) theory of learning categories in which he uses the 
term "context markers" to designate observations, which interpret the context 
from a few elements. This has significant implications for participating 
observation: It indicates that observers from the very beginning of their 
observations, based on a few and, most likely, unobserved observations, 
actualize specific expectations about the participants and the interaction. 
Expectations may, of course, later be proven wrong, but initially they actualize 
specific horizons of meaning, even in cases in which the observer decides to 
avoid immediate and spontaneous interpretations. A hardcore "open mind 
approach" is, from this perspective, nothing but explicit self-blinding. [15]
Repeated observations of specific utterances or acts from specific participants 
tend to construct a pattern of expectations, a pattern that is easily attributed to 
the person as "personality" (pp.297-298). These patterns of expectations are 
efficient reducers of complexity, because they indicate what to expect when the 
same human person is observed in a new context. Attribution introduces a 
potential lack of sensitivity regarding the possibility that a human individual 
appears as different persons, i.e. assume different roles in different contexts. As 
Gregory BATESON (1991, p.137) says, it is always possible to observe in such a 
way that one's expectations are confirmed. [16]
Observing in a way that does not take first impressions as the full picture but 
challenges them by seeking other descriptions and interpretation takes time and 
must be weighed against data lost by leaving parts of the ongoing interaction 
unobserved. Furthermore, impressions and expectations cannot be observed as 
a whole. Only what is observed as first impression—not the impression as whole
—can be submitted to second-order observation. [17]
Reduction of complexity from construction of behavioral patterns and attribution 
of personality cannot be avoided, nor can its possible and, to some extent, 
unobservable influence on observation. Nevertheless or, perhaps, because of 
this, the topic must be recognized as a condition for participating observation 
rather than stand unobserved or silenced. [18]
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3. Observing the Concept of Observation
The concept of observation could be expected to play a crucial role in the current 
methodology of participating observation. And, to some extent, it does. Karl 
WEICK (1985, p.569), for instance, talks about observation as follows: 
"Regarding the observation process, systematic observation makes self-conscious 
and full, clearly expressed notation on how the observation is done, goes about the 
observation activity in an alert manner that allows for tactical improvisations, imparts 
attention to objects in ways that in some sense are standardized, yet individually 
trained." [19]
Current methodology generally addresses participating observation by "asking 
from" the concept. The term "asking from" expresses that methodology takes the 
concept of observation for granted and mainly addresses how participating 
observation can be carried out. Reflections on what an observation "is" are rarely 
found. The absence of this type of question leaves the mere act of observation as 
a "black box" and the major "absorber of contingency" in data production based 
on in situ studies. [20]
3.1 Observation and reality
Two different understandings of the relation between phenomenon, reality and 
observation can be identified. One position defines descriptions as "close 
reflections of the world," whereas the other defines descriptions as "creation of 
the world" (SANJEK, 1990, p.15). The first indicates an epistemological approach 
similar to direct realism: What you observe is what happens. [21]
The other indicates some kind of constructivist approach. However, it should not 
be confused with the constructivist epistemology in the tradition represented by 
Gregory BATESON (2000, Heinz von FOERSTER (1985), Niklas LUHMANN 
(1988) and Humberto MATURANA and Francisco VARELA (1980). Rather, it 
seems to refer to a pragmatic statement that, as a consequence of a high 
complexity in the surroundings compared to the limited complexity the observer 
can handle in data production, observations must be conducted with a focused 
and disciplined glance. [22]
Accordingly, the two main positions seem to differ primarily in whether 
observation captures the world as a whole or creates the world by extracting 
selected segments. In other words, their epistemology differs mainly with respect 
to the degree of re-presentation. [23]
Niklas LUHMANN sees observation as a unity of the two events distinction and 
observation: "Observing means making a distinction and indicating one side (and 
not the other side) of the distinction" (2002c, p.85). [24]
This approach must not be confused with the ideas of focused and disciplined 
observation. For Niklas LUHMANN, re-construction is not solely a question of 
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extraction of specific segments. Rather, the object or phenomenon itself becomes 
a construction. We do not see an object as it is; we see the object as it emerges 
through the specific distinction used in the act of observation. Different observers 
may observe the same object—for instance, a specific car—and yet observe 
different cars—for instance, as a signifier of social class, as a threat to the 
environment, as a toy or as a practical object for transportation, depending on the 
distinctions used in observation. Correspondingly, human individuals and social 
interaction are not observed as they are but are shaped or created through the 
selected distinction. [25]
This is also well-known from Alfred KORZYBISK's famous saying: "The map is 
not the territory" (e.g., BATESON, 2000, pp.455f.). However, it is further 
radicalized by LUHMANN, who claims that an observer has no access to or 
knowledge about the territory as it is. Everything we know is a product of 
observation and refers to the observation, not to the observed. This position can 
be recognized in Heinz von FOERSTER's statement: "I disagree with Gregory 
Bateson. I say the map is the territory" (in SCHILLING, 1997, p.28). [26]
Niklas LUHMANN (2002d, p.136) does not call the reality of the external world 
into doubt. Nonetheless, knowledge about the external world refers to the 
observing system and finds no correlates in the environment of the system. 
Consequently, Niklas LUHMANN (p.132) talks about the de-ontologization of 
reality. That something appears to be real does not mean that there is something 
that correlates with the observation. Reality is, as Niklas LUHMANN puts it, the 
result of tests of consistency (1997, p.102). [27]
The epistemology in Niklas LUHMANN's systems theory puts a strong focus on 
the participant observer as observer, i.e. on the differences though which he or 
she produces, or should one say invents, empirical reality. [28]
3.2 Observation and observations of observations
As mentioned, Niklas LUHMANN describes observation as an operation that 
consists of two events: distinction, in which the world is split into a marked and 
unmarked space, and indication, in which the marked side is named (LUHMANN, 
2002c; 2002e). [29]
According to Niklas LUHMANN and George SPENCER-BROWN, differences do 
not exist in the environment. As Niklas LUHMANN puts it, the world does not 
demand to be observed in a specific way. Differences are not given by the world 
ahead of the act of observation but forced on it by an observer. This does not 
mean that the environment does not influence what can be observed. It may 
contain what Niklas LUHMANN (1988, p.41) calls "discontinuities," which may 
attract the attention of the observer. Or as George SPENCER-BROWN (1969, 
p.1) says: "contents are seen to differ in value." [30]
In the operation of observation, only the indicated, the inner side of the 
distinction, is revealed. While observing, the observer can neither observe the 
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unmarked space nor the difference used in the construction of reality: 
"Observation has to operate unobserved to be able to cut up the world" 
(LUHMANN, 2002c, p.87). An observation that designates a student as skilled 
cannot simultaneously observe that it uses the distinction skilled/unskilled, nor 
what it cannot see in using this difference, or that another difference will produce 
different information about the observed object. Niklas LUHMANN (e.g., 2002d, 
p.136) talks about the difference as the blind spot of the observation and about 
the observer as "the excluded middle of his observation" (LUHMANN, 2002f, 
p.190). As regards the latter, the original text uses the phrase "der Beobachter ist 
das ausgeschlossende Dritte seiner Beobachtung" ( LUHMANN, 1990, p.231) or 
directly translated "the observer is the excluded third of his or her observation." [31]
Consequently, there is no such thing as an objective or neutral observation. That 
something is designated as an objective fact simply refers to the circumstance 
that various observers agree on what is observed and that differences among 
observers can thus be ignored (LUHMANN, 2002d, p.136; LUHMANN, 2002f, 
p.188). Objectivity in this perspective guarantees no correspondence between 
observation and object but indicates that observations have been socially proven 
to whatever standards the specific social system takes into account. [32]
However, observations can observe previous observations and the differences 
used by them. Niklas LUHMANN (2002e) calls observations that observe 
observations "second-order observations." Hence, a demand to observe the 
observer seems to be a crucial dimension in observation methods. [33]
3.3 Who is the observer?
Perhaps, one of Niklas LUHMANN's most striking utterances about the relevance 
of second-order observations is found in his reflections on dysfunctional 
communication in families: "But if one wants to know what is "pathological," one 
must observe the observer who uses this description, not that which is described" 
(LUHMANN, 1995c, p.89; my translation). Dysfunctional communication is not 
something which "is" but something that comes into being when communication 
is observed through the difference dysfunctional - well-functioning, and specific 
communicative events are subsequently attributed to the inner side. And, 
accordingly, dysfunctionality—and descriptions in general—refer to the observer, 
not to the observed. [34]
According to Niklas LUHMANN (2002f, p.190), the observer does not exist ahead 
of the observation but emerges from the mere act of observation. A system 
becomes an observer through the distinction used in the act of observation. Any 
system or individual might observe an endless number objects and phenomena, 
just as several systems may construct similar observations. Consequently, the 
first cannot with plausibility be explained by referring to the latter. Attributing an 
event to a specific individual/system rather than to the act of observation may, of 
course, reduce complexity for the second-order observer but does not produce 
further information about the observed. Hence, observing the observer does not 
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mean to observe simply who the observer is and what is observed but to observe 
how a given observation was carried out:
"The usual understanding of the observation of observations focuses above all on 
what an observer observes (distinguishing thereby between subject and object, but 
concentrates above all on the object). Constructivism describes an observation of 
observation that concentrates on how the observed observer observes [...] by this 
means one can also observe what and how an observed observer is unable to 
observe. In this case one is interested in his blind spot, that is, the means by which 
things become visible or non-visible" (LUHMANN, 2002d, p.140). [35]
Observations observing previous observations can be designated second-order 
observations (e.g. LUHMANN, 2002e). Second-order observations do not bring 
the second-order observer closer to the object. They cannot claim any privileged 
position; they do not offer what Niklas LUHMANN (2002d, p.141) designates a 
"holier-than-thou" perspective. A second-order observation is like any other 
observation bound to the difference used to observe observation and to the fact 
that another difference would have led to another observation of the observed 
observation. Accordingly, second-order observations do not bring the observer 
closer to the object but allow for observation of how cognitive reality became 
visible, came into being. [36]
4. Observation Is Interpretation—The Ongoing Production of Meaning
The term "meaning" has so far denoted that observations produce meaning and 
that there are no such things as neutral observations. This section will 
concentrate further on the production of meaning and on what I will call "the myth 
of the naïve observer." [37]
Social and psychic systems process meaning. Meaning is, according to Niklas 
LUHMANN, a very abstract concept: 
"The phenomenon of meaning appears as a surplus of references to other 
possibilities of experience and action. Something stands in the focal point, at the 
center of the intention, and all else is indicated marginally as the horizon of an "and 
so forth" of experience and action" (LUHMANN, 1995a, p.60). [38]
Meaning in this sense becomes the unity of the difference "between what is 
actually given and what can possibly result from it" (p.74). Meaning is constituted 
in three dimensions: the fact dimension, the temporal dimension and the social 
dimension (pp.76-81). The three dimensions emerge intertwined but can be 
analyzed separately—for instance, when observing how the same utterance 
seems to produce different horizons of meaning when uttered by different 
persons and/or at different times. [39]
For systems operating in meaning, there are no alternatives to meaning: 
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"Not all systems process complexity and self-reference in the form of meaning; but 
for those that do, it is the only possibility. Meaning becomes for them the form of the 
world and consequently overlaps the difference between system and environment" 
(p.61). [40]
Meaning is the form of the world. It recursively draws on structures developed in 
the past and sketches out a horizon for possible interpretations and future. Due to 
this circularity, there is no way for an observing system to escape the past's 
influence on the fluctuating horizon of meaning that emerges and disappears as 
observations take place; a horizon which is never endlessly open, never 
completely determined. As participant, the observer is enrolled in the production 
of meaning. [41]
Current methodology seems—although conceptualized differently—to some 
extent to be aware of the circularity by which meaning simultaneously refers to 
something previous and produces new meaning. At least, a request to be aware 
of and, at best, to get rid of preconceived notions and expectations is quite 
common (e.g. DEWALT et al., 1998, p.288); whereas Cato WADEL (1991, p.59) 
says that the observer must act as a sociologist on him- or herself. [42]
Some approaches in anthropology emphasize the so-called "naïve observer" as 
an ideal for the observer's approach in participating observation. The idea seems 
to be that the observer, in order to understand the observed on its own 
conditions, must avoid forcing his or her cultural categories onto the observed 
(e.g. ANGUERA-ARGILAGA, 1979, p.451; WADEL, 1991, p.27). [43]
Max GLUCKMANN (2007), on the other hand, questions the notion of self-
attributed naivety. William D. CRANO and Marilynn B. BREWER (2002), Kathleen 
M. DEWALT et al. (1998) and Cato WADEL (1991) also express reservations 
about how much the observer can "put him- or herself aside." [44]
As an example of naïve observation, i.e. observation without drawing on "fixed" 
categories, Cato WADEL describes how a friend from the United States, who is 
unfamiliar with soccer but knows football, could describe the first five minutes of a 
soccer match.
"Several men, some dressed in red, some in blue, run into the arena. I count 22. I 
also count 10 red and 10 blue, and two who are dressed in green. All of them have a 
number on their back. The two men in green have the number 1. They take up 
position at a goal at each end of the field. The other men run about" (1991, p.80; my 
translation). [45]
This might seem like a naïve observer's description of social behavior. However, 
observation of these "naïve observations" reveal that previous horizons of 
meaning tend to reproduce themselves behind the back of the naïve observer. [46]
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Is it, for instance, likely that the term "goal" but not "player" will appear as notions 
for a naïve observer familiar with football? Would even a very naïve observer say 
that "the men run about" rather than they kick the ball to each other? [47]
Of course, these objections reflect the horizon of meaning that opens to me while 
I observe Cato WADEL's observations. This, however, confirms rather than 
contradicts the theoretical premise that the production of system-specific 
meaning is unavoidable and that observations say more about the observer than 
about the observed. [48]
The production of meaning cannot be escaped by describing "pure" behavior. 
Firstly, behavioral descriptions also use categories. Run is, for instance, a very 
condensed description of a countless number of actions; secondly, the term 
"runs" in itself produces another meaning than, for instance, "moves around," 
"walks" or "hurries." To run means something specific. What it means depends 
on the specific interaction system, on the context. [49]
5. Programs for Observation 
Niklas LUHMANN (1995a, p.317) describes a program as "a complex of 
conditions for the correctness (and thus for social acceptability) of behavior." As 
regard in situ observation, programs contain conditions for the observation 
process. Programs can be more or less detailed but will always be general and, in 
this sense, abstract descriptions of a forthcoming or carried-through course of 
observation. Accordingly, a program can be applied on a number of concrete 
courses of observation. Even a retrospective description will be abstract and 
describe the course of observation in categories and patterns rather than specific 
episodes. Programs can be further specified in plans, but even plans must be 
seen as abstractions of interaction. [50]
Reflections on and programs for participating observation are frequent in current 
methodological literature and concern a variety of aspects of the discipline, such 
as the role of the observer, the degree of participation, social relations, gender 
and note-taking (e.g. BERNARD, 1998; CRANO & BREWER, 2002; 
HAMMERSLEY, 2006; HEDEGAARD, 1984; HOWITT & CRAMER, 2005; 
LANGDRIDGE, 2004; LINDLOF, 1995; SANJEK, 1990; WADEL, 1991). [51]
Regarding programs for observation, Roger SANJEK (1990, pp.385-418) talks 
about the three canons of participating observation called "theoretical candor," 
the "ethnographer's path" and "field note evidence." His point is that the observer 
must be aware of what he or she is looking for in order to "avoid opportunistic 
study of everything" (SANJEK, 1990, p.398). [52]
However, as mentioned in the previous section, another position can be found. It 
claims that the observer must enter observation with "an open mind" to avoid 
forcing preconceived notions and concepts on interaction. [53]
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This approach is highly incompatible with the demand of transparency that seems 
to be an utmost necessity with an approach based on Niklas LUHMANN's 
systems theory. The incompatibility does not relate to cognitive openness but to 
transparency and the fact that entering observations without a disciplined glance 
makes what is observed completely random. Or as Roger SANJEK (1990, p.398) 
puts it: Allows for an opportunistic study of everything. Something will attract the 
observer's attention, produce meaning and frame future observations, but what 
attracts the attention is unpredictable and, to some extent, unobservable. [54]
One of the more spectacular descriptions of this approach is found in David 
LIPSET's description of the young Gregory BATESON's first anthropological field 
study: 
"Upon arrival, Bateson began measuring heads with calipers until one of the Baining 
asked why he was doing it. This so confused him that he was unable to explain 
himself, much less formulate a response in his then meager pidgin English. This 
termination of this part of his research did not clarify what he ought to do instead" 
(LIPSET, 1980, p.127). [55]
Roger SANJEK's concepts of theoretical candor and the ethnographer's path 
have parallels to three concepts that, drawing on Niklas LUHMANN, can be called 
guiding difference, system reference and point of observation. [56]
As the name suggests, guiding differences guide observations by creating a 
glance—a form—through which interaction is observed. They indicate what the 
observer is observing or is "looking for." In classroom research, a guiding 
difference could be "teacher-student feedback." Observing classroom interaction 
from this perspective will most likely produce another story about interaction than, 
for instance, the guiding difference "student-student interaction" or "exclusion." In 
this sense, guiding differences reduce complexity for the observer by indicating 
which episodes or events in the continuous stream of events the observer's 
awareness should be directed towards. Along with formulation of guiding 
differences, conditions for indication must be settled, i.e. under which conditions 
does a communicative event belong to the inner side of the guiding difference? In 
more common terms: How does one recognize, for instance, feedback; when is a 
communicative event designated as "feedback;" when is it merely a question or a 
response? [57]
Interaction has no inherent meaning. Episodes or events become what they 
become depending on the observer's system reference. System reference 
expresses the coding or conditioning of interaction from which single episodes 
gain meaning. Interaction and episodes will, for instance, emerge differently to 
the observer if observed from an educational point of view than if friendship, the 
economy or power is chosen as system reference. Answering a question with a 
counter question might appear to be impolite with friendship as system reference 
but as professional feedback if education is chosen as system reference. 
Certainty about the participating observer's system reference, in other words, 
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contributes to transparency concerning from where, i.e. from which perspective, 
interaction is observed. [58]
A third concept in programs for observation can be called "point of observation." It 
puts the focus on whose observations the participating observer observes. The 
current methodology of participating observation seems without exception to 
understand social interaction with human individuals as the point of reference, 
thus attributing social events (communication and actions) to single individuals. 
However, through his concept of social systems, Niklas LUHMANN offers unique 
opportunities to observe interaction as self-referring communication, describing 
how communication evolves, how and when themes emerge and fade away, how 
participants take part and redraw, etc., without reducing the dynamics of 
communication to acts and behavior of single individuals. [59]
The attempt to understand interaction as interaction is also a key topic in Gregory 
BATESON's work and is clearly expressed through his descriptions of 
symmetrical, complementary and reciprocal relations (BATESON, 2000). 
However, he never fully succeeds in finding a way to describe interaction and 
relations without dissolving them by attributing single actions to single individuals 
(e.g., BATESON 2000, pp.194-227, 271-278; KEIDING & LAURSEN, 2005, 
pp.160-161). [60]
Observing interaction with interaction as a point of observation does not exclude 
the possibility of focusing on selected dimensions of interaction. It could be 
specific persons or specific themes. Having interaction or selected dimensions of 
interaction as a point of observation simply means that interaction as a social 
system is understood and explained with reference to interaction, instead of trying 
to understand it with reference to single contributions or single participants. [61]
The claim for a disciplined glance should not be taken as an argument for 
stubbornness or lack of sensitivity. Of course, participating observers might 
benefit from cognitive openness, which allows for reflection on and adjustment of 
the program; but engaging in participating observation without transparency in the 
glance forced on interaction introduces a considerable randomness in what is 
observed as well as a fundamental lack of transparency and opportunities for 
observing the participating observer as observer. [62]
5.1 Thrown into interaction
Programs for participating observation cannot determine in situ observation. In 
general, one must, with Niklas LUHMANN, distinguish between planning and 
interaction. [63]
He addresses this topic in relation to both organizations (LUHMANN, 1975, p.15) 
and the educational system: "That aims and plans play a role is not put into 
question. They help to interpret not-unambiguous situation and decide on 
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subsequent steps if redundant capacity" (LUHMANN, 2002a, p.105; my 
translation)2. [64]
This means that a prior disciplined glance produced in the program for 
observation only influences observations if and as long as the observer is able to 
use it as program for reflection and selection of actions. However, observation 
and reflection on observation cannot take place simultaneously. The participating 
observer must either observe his or her observations or observe interaction. [65]
In this sense, participating observation—like any other observation—either 
operates in blindness or does not take place at all. [66]
The difference between program and interaction must not be seen as a problem 
of distance (too far from/close enough to) nor a problem with the level of abstraction 
(too general/adequately specific) and can definitely not be remedied by the 
addition of details to the program, although further details, at a first glance, might 
seem to bridge the gap between programmatic abstractions and concrete inter-
action. On the contrary, the difference between program and process is a logical 
consequence of seeing interaction as a self-referential social system emerging 
with reference to itself. Using the metaphor of distance, one might say that the 
more detailed the program—i.e. the lower the level of abstraction—the harder it 
will be to reflect—and recognize—program and interaction in each other. [67]
Niklas LUHMANN expresses the same insight with regard to the gap between 
organizational programs and organizational interaction: "Interaction follows its 
own systemic conditions and does not, or only partly, take organizational 
programs into consideration. What is organizationally expected is at the level of 
interaction continuously deformed or even intentionally sidetracked" (1975, p.15; 
my translation)3. [68]
5.2 A note on field notes: Transformation and reduction of complexity
In situ observations are often fixed in text and the discipline of taking field-notes 
and reflections on field notes are a key issue as regards current methodology on 
in situ observations (e.g., BERNARD, 1998; CRANO & BREWER, 2002; 
LANGDRIDGE, 2004). [69]
Russel H. BERNARD (1998, p.270) emphasizes the significance of the subject 
but avoids addressing it in depth: 
"A whole chapter should be devoted to discussing strategies for writing, managing, 
and analyzing field notes. Space limits make this impossible [...] A useful maxim that 
2 "Da Absichten und Pläne eine Rolle spielen, soll damit nicht bestritten sein. Sie verhelfen vor 
allem dazu, nicht-eindeutige Situationen zu interpretieren und weitere Schritte zu tun, wenn 
Kapazität dafür frei ist"
3 "Die Interaktion folgt ihren eigenen Systemgesetzen und nimmt das Organisationsprogramm 
nicht oder nur begrenzt auf. Das organisatorisch Vorgesehene wird auf der Ebene der 
Interaktion unterlaufen, deformiert oder gar absichtlich zum Entgleisen gebracht."
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we have always used in training students is that: "If you didn't write it down in your 
field notes, then it didn't happen (at least so far as being data for analysis)." [70]
Addressing field-notes from Niklas LUHMANN's perspective nevertheless reveals 
more fundamental questions than how to write notes. [71]
One must turn Russel H. BERNARD's maxim around and ask whether something 
happened if it is written in the field notes. If notes are all that is left from 
observation and the foundation for data analysis, the answer seems to be "yes." 
A premise that makes further reflections on field notes highly relevant. [72]
Observation first takes place in the observer's psychic system and, accordingly, 
gains the form of this system: thoughts, emotions and impressions. In order to fix 
observations in notes, the observer must first select which psychic events should 
to be fixed in field notes. Not everything observed in the psychic system is 
relevant, and not everything that is conditionally relevant can be fixed in notes. 
The gradient of complexity is always declining across the border between 
environment and system (LUHMANN, 1995a, pp.23f.). Interaction is more 
complex than the psychic system can observe, and the complexity of the psychic 
system is higher than what can be fixed in field notes. However, the 
transformation of psychic events into notes is not merely a matter of decline in 
subject-matter complexity. [73]
Psychic systems operate on the basis of thoughts, sensations, imagination 
(LUHMANN, 1995d, p.111). In contrast, notes are bound to forms provided by the 
language. Accordingly, note-taking includes transformation of non-linguistic 
psychic elements into linguistic forms. This transformation cannot be seen as a 
"neutral" preservation of meaning from one medium to another. In this sense, the 
writing of notes must be seen as complexity-reducing processes that interpret 
and transform and, consequently, might produce new horizons of meaning that, 
due to the permanence of the notes, are likely to become all that is left of the 
evanescent interaction. In this perspective, the specific words and phrases used 
in note-taking have a strong impact on the constructed reality. [74]
6. Conclusion
Approaching participating observation from systems theory and constructivism 
offers fundamental new insights into the topic. [75]
Observation is always participation. There is no way to escape becoming a 
participant and, as such, co-producer of the observed phenomenon. The actions 
of observed persons refer to and must be interpreted with the social system and 
its participants as points of reference. Moreover, in systems in which the observer 
observes a single person's interaction with objects, it must be taken into 
consideration that actions take place and refer to a social system. One might 
even consider whether the experience of being observed in a system consisting 
only of observed and observer is more present and has stronger influence on the 
observed than in social systems with several participants. [76]
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Consequently, the well-known opposition between participation and observation 
should be replaced by reflections on types of participation—for instance, as 
degrees of involvement or the advantages and disadvantages related to each 
single type of participating observation weighed in each specific case. [77]
Observation has to do with differences selected and forced on the observed 
environment by the observer. Different differences will produce different realities. 
The constructive epistemology that is a consequence of the tight coupling 
between observation and the handling of differences must not be mistaken for an 
idea of "selective re-presentation." Observation does not selectively grasp the 
world as it is but creates an observed world. Or, in other words, invents an 
observer-dependent reality. Accordingly, there is no such thing as a neutral or 
objective description. Anything said is said by an observer. [78]
Social and psychic systems process meaning. Their events do not occur in a 
vacuum but draw on and produce horizons of meaning, of future actions and 
interpretation. Observed events, in other words, produce expectations for and the 
meaning of subsequent events. The observer can never escape him- or herself 
and the flavor that his or her experiences and expectations give to the process of 
observation and interpretation. Hence, the idea of neutral descriptions as well as 
the idea of the naïve observer become a void. Not recognizing and observing 
oneself as observer and co-producer simply leaves the process of observation as 
the major unobserved absorber of contingency in data production based on 
participating observation. [79]
Field notes cannot be understood as neutral descriptions of observation but are 
seen as a linguistic form of psychic events. The transformation from 
consciousness into text both selects and interprets observations and creates a 
new reality. [80]
The main consequence of these insights is that observers must make themselves 
observable. This requires both a general theoretical framework that can offer 
descriptions sensitive to the complexity of participating observation and 
transparency in the specific process of observation. Significant contributions to 
transparency are: First, to decide what should be observed and from where 
observations should take place. Second, programs for indication: When is a 
social event relevant for the observed phenomenon? What should be included in 
the description? Third, to be aware that plans do not determine observation. They 
contribute to a disciplined glance if observed and used as a program for 
observation, but the observer cannot simultaneously observe "something" and 
observe the process of observation. He or she must continuously choose what to 
observe. Observation either observes previous observations or operates in 
blindness. [81]
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